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Abstract. Where the institutions of the retention at source of taxes and the prevention of foreign financial 
intermediaries from assuming in the source country the liability to file tax information and arrange for the payment 
of tax in fair conditions comparable to their domestic counterparts are to be assessed in the light of the relevant 
Community law as communicated by the ECJ, it is crucial while concluding whether national legal practices of 
withholding taxation are consistent with Community law to apply the proportionality principle in specific cases. 
Where the application of the proportionality principle dictates us in a specific case respect of the effectiveness 
principle in enforcing rights both on the side of the tax authorities and taxpayers, an avenue may open up for 
progressively removing barriers from the clearing and settlement of securities transactions across the border. This 
paper is to discuss how the EC principles of effectiveness and proportionality are to be enforced by the European 
Court of Justice with regard to removing barriers from the free movement of services and capital upon withholding 
taxation. 
Keywords: effectiveness principle, proportionality principle, withholding tax, retention versus relief at source of 
or from taxes, paying and information agent
I. Procedural rule of reason and industry-specific problems 
As the procedural aspect is the compliment of, and corollary to, the exercise of substantive 
law rights,1 it is worth distinguishing between procedural and substantive tax law. Procedural 
possibilities that are available for taxpayers must be interpreted some times in the context 
of the positive standard of effectiveness as developed in Arcaro (and later in the tax case of 
Persche): national procedures are to be assessed in the light of the purpose that they should 
be aimed at ensuring fulfilment of the substantive law contents of Community freedoms. At 
the same time, the national public authorities must be consistent in interpreting national law 
in the light of Community law. Connection between procedural and substantive tax law can 
also be reversed: procedural law may fill the gaps left for lack of Community law 
harmonisation, substituting for substantive law. This is to proceduralise a substantive law 
problem. An example for this is Inizan or 446/03 Marks and Spencer: the national authorities 
are not required to change their legislation, but are expected to grant the taxpayer an extra 
opportunity for the easy enforcement of rights consistently with the proportionality principle 
where the taxpayer has otherwise exhausted all other possibilities. 
Upon the clearing and settlement (finalisation) of cross-border capital market 
transactions, it is a common problem that foreign resident taxpayers and foreign financial 
intermediaries are discriminated, or even they are deprived from fundamental procedural 
rights. Domestic resident market players may also suffer from the lack of effectiveness in 
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1 309/85 Barra, ECR 1988, 355, para. 17. 
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enforcing their rights. For example, the business of local paying agents with foreign 
investors may be burdensome or domestic resident taxpayers may face problems in their 
own legal system if they enter the border while investing between two Member States in 
the internal market. 
Even if the procedural rules are part of the constitutional order of Member States, 
harmonisation promoted by reference to the so-called procedural rule of reason.2 
Accordingly, the national legislation on procedural rights curtailing the taxpayer’s claim 
may be compatible with Community law, it is subject to the following conditions, 
however: 
(i) it must not be intended specifically to limit the consequences of an ECJ judgment; and 
(ii) the restriction on taxpayer rights (e.g. the introduction of a time-bar) must be sufficient 
to ensure that the right to (re)payment is effective (e.g. by introducing transitory 
provisions). 
The major industry-specific problems that will be discussed below in the light of the 
above considerations can be highlighted as follows: 
(i) Lack of effectiveness to be granted to foreign resident taxpayers can be mentioned 
in brief as follows: 
– access to fiscal relief may be difficult; relief at source is not always possible, e.g. in 
Germany or the netherlands; 
– availability of quick refund procedures may be limited, delay in refund may occur 
(good examples are, on the contrary, e.g. in Germany:     
“Datentraegerverfahren” or “Data Medium Procedure”); 
– lack of European-wide harmonised relief models; and 
– foreign resident taxpayers may be deprived of procedural rights. 
(ii) non-discrimination of foreign financial intermediaries can be highlighted at the 
major points as follows: 
– local tax iD is usually required for foreign financial intermediaries; representation 
through a national subsidiary or a local PE may be obliged to serve as a paying agent (e.g. 
in italy); 
– payment to foreign intermediaries is not possible in gross; no responsibility is given 
to a foreign intermediary either to transfer information; 
– foreign intermediaries have to bear strict and unlimited liability for any failure (high 
level of the standard of care) instead of applying a good faith standard; and 
– limited possibility of self-certification through contracting out (good examples are, 
e.g. the “Know Your Customer” rules in the U.S. or the institution of “Qualified 
intermediaries” in ireland). 
(iii) Lack of effectiveness to be granted to domestic resident taxpayers active across 
the border can be exemplified as follows: 
– paying agents may be obliged to bear strict, and joint and several, liability for 
withholding taxation (e.g. in Hungary); 
– the centralised model developed in major European capital-exporting countries (e.g. 
through Euroclear, called “Central Securities Depository”) has not yet been proliferated in 
many Member States (like in CEE countries); and 
– the opportunities of simplified reporting of taxpayer information (like the Dutch 
pattern of GGC or “Large Authorised Representative”), have not yet proliferated. 
2 C-62/00 Marks and Spencer, ECR 2002, i-6325, para. 36. 
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Lessons can be drawn in particular from the ECJ cases as indicated in a matrix below: 
Community harmonisation  
of tax procedural rights 
Cases not decided in favour  
of the MS 
Cases decided in favour  
of the MS 
(i) Procedural rights: 
effectiveness to be granted to 
foreign resident taxpayers 
(exercising, as a last resort, the 
freedom of capital) 
Fokus Bank (free movement of 
capital), ELISA (free movement 
of capital) 
FKP Scorpio (freedom to 
provide services), Skatteverket v. 
A. (free movement of capital), 
Rimbaud (free movement of 
capital) 
(ii) Access to relief: equivalence 
or non-discrimination to be 
granted to foreign resident 
financial intermediaries (usually 
exercising the freedom to 
provide services) 
Svensson and Gustavsson 
(freedom to provide services), 
Safir (freedom to provide 
services), Danner (freedom to 
provide services), Skandia and 
Ramstedt (freedom to provide 
services) 
(iii) Procedural rights: 
effectiveness as a positive 
standard to be granted to foreign 
resident citizens and enterprises 
(exercising the freedom of 
persons) to ensure fulfilment of 
Community freedoms and to be 
consistent in interpreting 
national law in the light of 
Community law 
Heylens (free movement of 
workers), Marleasing (freedom 
of establishment), Vlassopoulou 
(freedom of establishment), 
Arcaro (harmonisation of the 
protection of environment) 
(iv) Procedural rights: 
effectiveness to be granted to 
domestic resident taxpayers 
active across the border 
(exercising, as a last resort, the 
freedom of capital) 
San Giorgio (free movement of 
goods), Barra (free movement 
of workers, non-discrimination), 
Peterbroeck (freedom of 
establishment), Société Baxter 
(freedom of establishment), 
Vestergaard (freedom to provide 
services), Metallgesellschaft and 
Hoechst (freedom of 
establishment), Laboratoires 
Fournier (freedom of 
establishment), Persche (free 
movement of capital) 
Algera (not in favour of more 
harmonisation), Rewe (free 
movement of goods), Comet 
(free movement of goods), 
Deutsche Milchkontor  
(free movement of goods), 
Berlin Butter (free movement of 
goods), Inizan (freedom to 
provide services), Twoh Int. 
(free movement of goods),  
X and Passenheim  
(free movement of capital) 
(v) Procedural rights: 
effectiveness to be granted to 
domestic and foreign resident 
taxpayers through the possible 
harmonisation in fiscal matters 
C-349/03 Commission v. UK 
(free movement of goods) 
C-338/01 Commission v. 
Council (not in favour of more 
harmonisation), C-533/03 
Commission v. Council (not in 
favour of more harmonisation) 
II. Analysis of ECJ cases 
1. Effectiveness in the protection of the rights of foreign resident taxpayers 
The taxpayers who are active across the border want to benefit usually from the free 
movement of capital principle. in a few Member States, relief at source (based on a 
respective bilateral double tax convention) is not available. instead, those who claim treaty 
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relief must enter into burdensome procedures to get tax refund. The difficulties arising from 
national practices in claiming treaty relief results in restriction on the fundamental 
Community freedoms, mainly on the freedom of capital. The national legislator or the 
national public authorities do not have the explicit intention to do discrimination. it can still 
be problematic that foreign taxpayers cannot get easy access to the national law facilities of 
the host Member State. They are thus not able to protect their rights effectively. 
it can be criticised that foreign resident shareholders do not always have rights as 
parties to administrative proceedings. it is apparently more comfortable for the national tax 
authorities to get in contact with the relevant domestic resident subsidiary. it is discriminatory, 
however, if foreign resident shareholders are not recognised as parties to the procedures of 
tax administration. Apparently, their interests are not necessarily the same as those of the 
subsidiary. They are thus deprived of the possibility effectively to protect their rights. 
The practice has spread over in the European Economic Area that foreigners are not 
given taxpayer rights upon the withholding of taxes.3 it comes from that foreign resident 
taxpayers are subject to tax in the source country without having been granted the right to 
protect their rights to be associated with the liability to pay tax. Quite frequently, foreign 
taxpayers are not allowed to initiate disputes with the local tax authorities concerning the 
title to, and the qualification of, the income they derive from the country. They will only be 
recognised as parties to administrative procedures if they apply for refund. 
national orders must not impair the individual rights flowing from the fundamental 
freedoms, the EFTA Court holds (in Para. 41 of Fokus Bank). Such an obligation of the host 
country follows from the effectiveness principle enshrined in both the EC Treaty and the 
EEA Treaty. Even if foreign resident taxpayers have the right to file complaints in the host 
country, they are not notified of the reassessment of withholding tax. They are thus deprived 
of the right to be heard (Para. 42). 
if the relief at source method is available for foreign taxpayers, they are not in a need 
of initiating procedures according to the host country’s law, provided, however, that no 
dispute is (and will be) developed between the taxpayer and the tax authorities. During a 
tax audit, reassessment is not precluded. Then, the taxpayers subject to withholding tax 
should be recognised as parties to the procedure of tax audit. Refund is obviously less 
favourable for taxpayers than the use of the relief at source method. However, applying for 
tax refund, foreign taxpayers are most likely recognised as parties to the procedure of 
refund. This is a paradoxical development that comes from the sporadic nature of 
Community law harmonisation. 
in FKP Scorpio,4 the procedure of retention at source of tax was not found inconsistent 
with the freedom to provide services either at the level of the payment creditor (the foreign 
resident taxpayer) or the payment debtor (the domestic resident paying agent). Restriction 
can be justified in this case by the host Member State’s need to ensure that the taxable 
income should not escape taxation. Fiscal supervision is thus a legitimate need (Para. 35). 
The ruling of ECJ does not concern, however, a situation where the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive can be invoked, which was not available in this case (Para. 36). The national law 
procedure of retention at source was also scrutinised in the light of the proportionality 
principle. The ECJ concluded that the national law restriction could also be justified in this 
respect. The question has eventually remained open how the retention at source procedure 
3 E-1/04 Fokus Bank, judgment of the EFTA Court on 23 november 2004, para. 45. 
4 C-290/04, ECR (2006), i-9461, para. 39. 
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can be justified by the need of fiscal supervision in a situation where the affected Member 
States can rely on the armoury to be provided by the Mutual Assistance Directive. The ECJ 
also holds that it constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide services if tax relief can 
be taken into account at the various stages of the taxation procedure only upon production 
of a certificate issued by the home Member State, stating that the conditions for treaty relief 
are satisfied. This obstacle can be justified, however, by the need that the proper functioning 
of the procedure for taxation at source must be ensured (Paras 58–59). 
The judgment does not make an assessment of the affected national taxation procedure 
in respect of the requirement of certification. it only mentions about that certificates may be 
required. it does not give guidance of how certification must take place. it is thus not 
precluded that the requirement of certificates is burdensome, not being proportionate with 
the objective of the effectiveness in tax collection. 
The problem of FKP Scorpio is also raised in respect of a service-provider who is 
resident in a state outside the EEA. Although the freedom to provide services is not 
available for those who reside outside the EU, the Community freedom to provide services 
is applicable not only to the service-provider, but also to the recipient of services who is 
resident in an EU Member State (Para. 63 in FKP Scorpio). indeed, the paying agent who 
is liable to respect the law on the retention at source of tax and to obtain certificates that 
prove eligibility for treaty relief must be provided with the possibility of benefiting from 
the Community principle that taxpayer rights must be effectively protected. in the specific 
case, the recipient of services (FKP Scorpio) is not entitled to benefit from the Community 
freedom to provide services because the provider of services is not established in an EU 
Member State (Para. 67). Any way, the difficulties arising from the retention at source 
procedure and from burdensome formalities of certification must in principle be assessed 
not only in respect of the provider, but also of the recipient of services if otherwise 
the services are provided within the Community by those who are established in a Member 
State. 
in ELISA, it is clarified that the EC Mutual Assistance Directive does not preclude the 
application of a double tax convention. This is still spelled out not in general terms, but in 
the instance that the particular provisions of a double tax convention may prevent the 
requested Member State from collecting, using and transferring information by its laws in 
accordance with Art. 8 (1) of the Mutual Assistance Directive.5 This does not mean that 
restrictive national law practices, such as the procedure of taxation at source, could not be 
found in certain cases as inconsistent with the free movement of capital principle or with 
other Community freedoms. Procedural rules must eventually be assessed in the light of 
Community freedoms. national administrative practices need not be harmonised, and 
cannot be condemned, unless they prevent citizens and companies from exercising their 
Community freedoms. 
As it also comes from this ECJ case, national law may despite the harmonisation of the 
mutual assistance in tax matters constitute an obstacle to the exchange of cross-border tax 
information where a double tax convention excludes from its scope tax haven companies. 
This is why the French tax legislator felt to be legitimised while categorically excluding 
non-French companies from tax relief if the respective double tax convention does not make 
it possible to the French tax authorities to obtain information of them. it is yet another issue 
5 Council Directive 77/799/EEC OJ L 336, 27.12.1977, 15, as amended significantly by Council 
Directive 92/12/EC, OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, 1; C-451/05 ELISA, ECR 2007, i-8251, para. 55. 
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that it is not consistent with the proportionality principle if taxpayers will not be granted the 
opportunity to prove on the contrary to the legislative presumption that they meet the legal 
requirements for the grant of tax relief. 
As arises from Para. 102, the free movement of capital principle precludes national 
legislation when national law does not allow a company established in another Member 
State to supply evidence to establish the identity of its shareholders and, this way, prevents 
such a company from obtaining tax relief. The ECJ held that the taxpayer should not be 
excluded “a priori” from providing relevant documentary evidence enabling the tax 
authorities of the Member State imposing the tax to ascertain that the taxpayer would not 
attempt the avoid or evade the payment of taxes.6 Relief at source cannot thus be precluded 
if the taxpayer is successful in providing evidence for fulfilling the requirements for the 
treaty relief claimed. Obviously, the national tax authorities can also rely on the facilities of 
the EC Mutual Assistance Directive. Even if these facilities are not available for any reason, 
national law restrictions must not be in breach of the proportionality principle either. 
it can happen that there is no possibility to have resort to the framework of Community 
law harmonisation as provided for by the EC Mutual Assistance Directive. This is clear in 
cases Skatteverket v. A.7 and Rimbaud.8 The proportionality principle cannot be invoked 
either. indeed, the application of the proportionality principle does not seem to be appropriate 
where the source country entities reside in tax havens (in these cases, in a Swiss canton and 
in Liechtenstein, respectively), and the source jurisdiction is not willing to provide sufficient 
information to the residence country’s tax authorities. 
in Scorpio, the legal framework provided for by the EC Mutual Assistance Directive is 
missing as well. The ECJ did not feel to be compelled to rely on the proportionality principle 
on its merits, however. The principle is just mentioned (in Paras 37–38), but it is not 
explained why the retention at source procedure is found to be consistent with the 
proportionality principle. While in the tax haven-related cases of Skatteverket v. A. and 
Rimbaud the tax authorities seem to be authorised not to relax their practices, this standpoint 
does not seem to be justified in Scorpio. it tells us the future only how much the Scorpio-
attitude can be maintained, and how the ECJ position taken in ELISA that is based on the 
application of the proportionality principle can be reconciled with its less ambitious 
approach taken in Scorpio. 
in Skatteverket v. A., the ECJ clarifies that the concept of restrictions on the free 
movement of capital is different, depending on whether the movement of capital takes place 
to or from third countries or within the Community (Para. 36). This is because the 
liberalisation of the movement of capital with third countries may pursue objectives other 
than that of establishing the internal market (Para. 31). Upon interpreting the procedural 
law infrastructure, it must not be out of consideration that it is not the same concept of 
restrictions on the free movement of capital that must be secured. The procedural law 
facilities could thus be restricted in respect of third countries where the free movement of 
capital principle is also restricted in its scope, to be compared to its application in the 
context of the single European market. As explained by the ECJ, where the legislation of a 
Member State makes the grant of a tax advantage dependent on satisfying requirements, 
6 Para. 96. See also: Case C-254/97 Baxter ECR 1999, i-4809, paras 19 and 20; Case C-39/04 
Laboratoires Fournier, ECR 2005, i-2057, para. 25. 
7 C-101/05 A, ECR 2007, i-11531. 
8 C-72/09, ECR 2010, 00000. 
189REMOVinG TAX BARRiERS FROM...
compliance with which can be verified only by obtaining information from the competent 
authorities of a third country, it is, in principle, legitimate for that Member State to refuse to 
grant that advantage. This is the case, in particular, because that third country is not under 
any contractual obligation to provide information. Thus, it proves impossible to obtain such 
information from that country.9 
it has been the standard in the ECJ practice that the justification based on the fight 
against tax evasion is permissible only if it targets purely artificial contrivances. Accordingly, 
a general assumption of tax avoidance or evasion fails to justify a restrictive national tax 
measure.10 The retention at source of tax procedure is a restriction on the free movement of 
capital at least because it discourages the taxpayer to be active in investment in another 
Member State if encountered with difficulties in enforcing treaty benefits. it cannot surely 
be justified by the general assumption of tax avoidance because–as held by the ECJ–such 
justification would be in breach of the proportionality principle. Even if the national tax 
authorities of a Member State are not able for any reason to have recourse to the exchange 
of tax information to be provided by the tax authorities of another Member State or EEA 
country, the tax authorities should conduct a case-by-case assessment of the information 
provided by the taxpayer whether this information can be verified, the Commission argues 
in Rimbaud (Para. 45). A case-by-case assessment could perfectly be possible in a procedure 
of claiming the relief of double tax conventions as well. The national tax authorities are 
usually able to verify the information the taxpayer may have provided of fulfilling the 
conditions for treaty relief. 
The argument that the case of Rimbaud did not differ from that of ELISA due to the 
fact that the Luxembourg tax authorities were prevented from providing information like 
the Liechtenstein tax authorities was dismissed by the ECJ. The ECJ held that, even though, 
in the situation which was under consideration in ELISA, the Luxembourg authorities were 
not, by virtue of Art. 8(1) of Directive 77/799, under any obligation in principle to provide 
information, the fact remained that the regulatory framework was quite different (Para. 46). 
Such a regulatory framework for cooperation between the tax authorities of different 
Member States is usually not missing in a procedure of taxation at source. There is thus no 
reason to refrain from switching from the retention at source of tax method to that of the 
relief at source. The national tax authorities of a Member State should be able to verify the 
information provided by the financial intermediaries, who accompany their clients active in 
investing in another Member State. 
in the above cases, it was the main problem that foreign resident taxpayers were not 
granted effectiveness in protecting their rights. As a result, taxpayers were usually prevented 
from exercising their right to the free movement of capital. They are not only confronted 
with difficulties in claiming national law or treaty relief, but it can also happen in these 
cases that they are deprived of their procedural rights. Such mistreatment cannot be upheld 
in the light of Community freedoms, however. 
    9 Para. 63, reiterated in Rimbaud, para. 44. 
10 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, ECR 2006, i-7995, para. 50, reiterated in Rimbaud, para. 34. 
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2. Equivalence accorded to foreign resident financial intermediaries 
The practice of Member States to apply withholding taxes at source may constitute barriers 
to the exercise of fundamental freedoms. This is to hurt foreign resident taxpayers, who 
derive income across the border. Being discouraged from cross-border investment, they will 
be prevented from exercising their right to the freedom of capital. Financial intermediaries 
may also be prevented from offering withholding agent services across the border if they do 
not enjoy a level playing field with their domestic resident counterparts. The restrictive 
practice of the retention of taxes at source may thus result in the infringement of both the 
free movement of capital and the freedom to provide services. 
The free movement of capital principle can be applied in parallel to the freedom to 
provide services (e.g. Svensson and Gustavsson).11 in another legal case (Safir), the freedom 
to provide services is carved out by the EC Court from the national court’s question relating 
to several freedoms, including the free movement of capital.12 it comes from Barrier 11 
(and 12)13 that the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital principles 
are highlighted as the two different sides of the same coin. it depends on the intonation only 
whether the stress is laid on the services provided by financial intermediaries rather than on 
the investor’s choice. As it comes from the case of Svensson and Gustavsson, a rule that 
makes the grant of interest rate subsidies subject to the requirement that the loans have been 
obtained from an establishment approved in a certain Member State constitutes dis-
crimination not only against the applicant, but also against credit institutions established in 
other Member States, and is inconsistent with the freedom to provide services principle 
accordingly (Para. 12). This is the problem of the missing level playing field. Foreign 
financial enterprises may suffer from discrimination not only if they cannot gain access to 
clients who may apply for subsidised loans, but also in cases where they are prevented from 
performing withholding services by transferring information and untaxed income in a 
custody chain if necessary. 
The taxpayer in Safir complains about that when a person holding a policy issued by a 
company not established in Sweden applies for an exemption from, or reduction of, tax on 
the life insurance premiums, “Skattemyndigheten” requires precise information concerning 
the income tax to which the company is subject, unless the authorities already have such 
information. As Jessica Safir points out, such a requirement is particularly burdensome for 
the policyholder. it may also dissuade insurance companies, which do not operate on the 
Swedish market, from offering their services there, since it means that those companies 
must provide their potential customers with precise information relating to the tax system 
applicable to those companies in another Member State (Para. 28). Where a Member State 
introduces a burdensome procedure that is only applicable to cross-border cases, such a 
policy restricts among other things the Community freedom to provide services, 
discriminating against foreign financial enterprises. This is also the case with foreign 
financial enterprises if they are confronted with extra legal requirements associated with 
11 C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, ECR 1995, i-3955. 
12 C-118/96 Jessica Safir, ECR 1998, i-1897. 
13 Giovannini Group, Second report on EU clearing and settlement arrangements, Brussels, 
April 2003, 11. The results of the Giovannini reports are reflected within the Commission 
communication on “Clearing and settlement in the EU–The way forward”, COM (2004) 312 final, 
under heading “3.2. Taxation issues”. 
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withholding taxation, while offering services to their clients, who enter the market of 
another Member State. 
Finally, the ECJ did not find as legitimate the need to fill the fiscal vacuum arising 
from the non-taxation of savings in the form of capital life assurance policies taken out with 
companies not established in Sweden (Para. 34). in other words, the Swedish law that 
provides for the fiscal vacuum to be filled is in breach of the proportionality principle. 
Similarly, the assumption of a fiscal vacuum that is filled by the retention of tax at source 
may also be found as inconsistent with the proportionality principle. 
in Danner, national governments contend that the non-deductibility of contributions 
paid to schemes operated by foreign insurance enterprises is justified by the need to ensure 
the effectiveness of fiscal controls, and to prevent tax evasion.14 That argument cannot be 
upheld, the ECJ holds because first, Member States may rely on the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive (Para. 49), secondly, they may request the taxpayer to provide sufficient proof of 
fulfilling the legal requirements (Para. 50). The reliance on the Mutual Assistance Directive 
and on the principle of proportionality are issues that are also relevant to the problem of 
discrimination both against foreign investors and foreign financial intermediaries that are 
confronted with the retention at source of income tax.15 
3.  Effectiveness as a positive standard in the protection of the rights of foreign resident  
citizens and enterprises 
Foreign resident citizens or enterprises may be mistreated in a host Member State, where 
they are not granted effectiveness in law enforcement in the sense that national law practices 
omit to apply a positive standard. This means that national treatment should ensure 
fulfilment of Community freedoms. Then, procedural rules must be assessed from the 
viewpoint whether they constitute obstacles to the exercise of substantive freedoms. 
Procedural rules are thus not to be assessed taken by itself, but to the extent that they may 
constitute barriers to the exercise of substantive law rights. Besides, the national public 
authorities, while exercising their power, are expected to be consistent with Community law 
in interpreting national law. if this is not the case, Community freedoms may be violated. 
This problem usually concerns the freedom of persons. in the tax law area, no legal cases 
emerged for a long time to illustrate the above-mentioned positive standard (see, however, 
the tax case of Persche as discussed below in the next session). Still, it will be interesting to 
take a look at non-tax cases to try to learn from them with particular regard to the failure of 
national legal measures to grant foreign resident taxpayers the opportunity of the easy 
enforcement of rights. 
A procedure for the recognition of the equivalence of diplomas must enable the national 
authorities to assure themselves on an objective basis that the foreign diploma certifies that 
its holder has knowledge and qualifications, which are equivalent to those certified by the 
national diploma.16 The person, who is subject to a procedure before the national authorities 
must also be able to defend his or her rights under the best possible conditions and have the 
possibility of deciding with a full knowledge of the relevant facts whether there is any point 
in their applying to the courts (Para. 15). it is an effectiveness standard that is determined 
14 C-136/00 Danner, ECR 2002, i-8147, para. 44. 
15 Reiterated in paras 43 and 45, respectively, in C-422/01 Skandia and Ramstedt, ECR 
2003, i-6817. 
16 222/86 Heylens, ECR 1987, 4097, para. 13. 
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by the ECJ in this case. The public authorities should have the right of full assessment of 
the private party’s case, but the latter is also allowed to defend himself or herself effectively. 
An alternative to the taxation at source procedure by allowing relief at source could in 
principle be designed in a way that both the tax authorities and taxpayers could be granted 
the possibility of effectiveness in enforcing their respective rights. 
The Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged 
by the directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, 
to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States 
including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. it follows that, in applying 
national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, 
the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the 
light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued 
by the latter.17 
There are two standards the ECJ identifies in this case. First, the purpose of a national 
law procedure must be to ensure by all appropriate methods the fulfilment of legal 
obligations consistently with Community law. The national authorities are therefore not 
only obliged to refrain from what would be a barrier to the exercise of Community freedoms, 
but they have to do everything necessary to be consistent in their actions with Community 
law. This is a very high standard, in the light of which it is doubtful whether the “a priori” 
exclusion of a relief at source procedure is consistent with Community law. Secondly, the 
national authorities are obliged to give interpretation of national law in full compliance with 
Community law. The question is in this instance no longer about the enforcement of 
individual rights and obligations. instead, the dispute is placed on a higher level. The 
consistent interpretation of national law principle is a meta-principle, on the level of which 
subjective rights cannot be discussed. it is still closely connected with the positive expression 
of the effectiveness principle in cases like Marleasing. Other examples for that are 
Vlassopoulou and C-168/95 Arcaro. 
Subjective rights cannot be enforced in the context of Community law unless they are 
built into the structure of Community law that has been developed. in addition to the 
enforcement of individual rights, the meta-principles of Community law–and even the 
principles of the operation of Community institutions–must be taken into account. Examples 
of the principles of the operation of Community institutions include the democracy principle 
and the subsidiarity principle. The principles of the superiority of Community law over 
national law or that of direct applicability are meta-principles of Community law. The 
principles of proportionality or legal certainty can also be considered as meta-principles of 
Community law. Meta-principles do not concern substantive rights or fundamental freedoms. 
They are authoritative as to the mechanisms, according to which the rules of Community 
law can be applied, serving as the legal foundation for decisions of the public authorities, 
where written sources of law fail to provide an answer. All these meta-principles are material 
to the enforcement of individual rights. They do not imply procedural rights as such, 
however. 
in Arcaro, the national court seeks to ascertain whether, upon a correct interpretation 
of Community law, there is a method of procedure allowing the national court to eliminate 
from national legislation provisions that are contrary to a provision of a directive which has 
17 C-106/89 Marleasing, ECR 1990, i-4135, para. 8, reiterated in C-340/89 Vlassopoulou, ECR 
1991, i-2357, see paras 17 and 22, and in C-168/95 Arcaro, ECR 1996, i-4705, para. 41. 
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not been transposed, where the latter provision may not be relied on before the national 
court in criminal proceedings. The answer the ECJ has given is that there is no such method 
of procedure in Community law. However, the national authorities are obliged to follow a 
procedure in which it is possible to achieve the result envisaged by Community law (Paras 
39–40). in this instance, the ECJ reiterates what was already said in Marleasing. The relief 
at source procedure, and the deprivation of foreign financial intermediaries and their clients 
of procedural rights in the source Member State does not seem to be consistent with this 
standard of effectiveness to be granted to taxpayers. 
4. Effectiveness in the protection of the rights of domestic resident taxpayers 
The Community law principle of effectiveness is applicable not only to foreign, but also to 
domestic resident taxpayers, who are active across the border (exercising, as a last resort, 
the freedom of capital). Lack of effectiveness in the enforcement of rights may be a problem 
that concerns not only foreign resident investors or foreign financial intermediaries, but also 
domestic resident participants of European capital markets, that is, those domestic taxpayers, 
who are active as investors entering the state border, or who are the recipients of the services 
of foreigners. For example, there may be problems in claiming exemption of foreign earned 
income or foreign tax credit. Or, for instance, Fokus Bank as a domestic subsidiary or FKP 
Scorpio as a domestic resident recipient of the services of foreign artists may also encounter 
difficulties in handling the international tax issues of withholding taxation. 
The issues of public administration have emerged in the ECJ practice since the early 
times. Some examples for the matters that have been subject to the ECJ scrutiny are as 
follows: 
– revocation of administrative decisions and protection of vested rights; 
– partial validity of administrative decisions; 
– passing of time limits; 
– taking due care by the public authorities in obtaining information of the relevant 
facts and data; 
– burden of proof; 
– activity of monitoring; and 
– consideration of national tribunals seized of a matter of their own motion whether 
national law is compatible with Community law. 
it has been spelled out that although the solutions in Member States may vary, the ECJ 
is invited to rely on the learned writing and case law of Member States, reconciling 
differences if necessary.18 
(i) Equivalence and effectiveness 
As it comes from San Giorgio, it is incompatible with Community law to apply in a Member 
State legal presumptions or rules of evidence intended to place upon the taxpayer the burden 
of establishing that the charges unduly paid has not been passed on to other persons, or the 
national rules of special limitations concerning the form of the evidence to be adduced, 
such as the exclusion of any kind of evidence other than documentary one. The court seized 
of the specific matter must be free to decide whether or not the burden of charges has been 
passed on to other persons.19 Where the procedure of producing evidence as provided for by 
18 Joined cases of 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57 Algera, ECR, 62–63. 
19 199/82 San Giorgio, ECR 1983, 3595, para. 14. 
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national legislation must not be burdensome to the extent that it would not be proportionate 
with legislative goals, the retention at source of taxation procedure must not be without 
alternatives either, and relief or simplified refund procedures should be available as well for 
both foreign resident taxpayers and the domestic paying agents assisting the former. 
A burdensome national law procedure of providing evidence may constitute a barrier to the 
exercise of Community freedoms (freedom of capital in respect of the investor and freedom 
to provide services in respect of the local paying agent or of foreign financial intermediaries 
that have accompanied their clients to another Member State). 
in Barra, the ECJ had the opportunity plainly to express the idea that it can be an 
impediment to the exercise of Community freedoms if not supported by appropriate 
procedural law institutions: 
“The right to repayment of amounts charged by a Member State in breach of the rules 
of Community law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on 
individuals by the Community provisions as interpreted by the court. Whilst it is true 
that repayment may be sought only in the framework of the conditions as to both 
substance and form laid down by the various national laws applicable thereto, the fact 
nevertheless remains … that those conditions … may not be so framed as to render 
virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by Community law.”20 
To the extent that national law restricts repayment of the duty introduced in breach of 
the rules of Community law solely to plaintiffs, who brought an action for repayment before 
the delivery of the judgment in case 293/83 Gravier, where the ECJ found the imposition to 
foreign students of a national vocational training fee incompatible with Community law, 
actually deprives individuals who do not satisfy that condition of the right to obtain 
repayment of amounts unduly paid. Such a provision renders the exercise of the rights 
conferred by the effectiveness principle of EC Treaty impossible (Para. 19 in Barra). As it 
is clear from this judgment, the ECJ did not endorse the national law restriction of the 
possibility of repayment to those, who acted in good faith in accordance with the national 
law assumption. in the light of this judgment, national law restriction of tax relief to those 
who are supposed to act in good faith cannot be accepted in cases either where the facility 
of relief at source is not available, based on the legislative assumption that tax avoidance or 
evasion cannot be precluded otherwise. 
The obligations imposed by national legislation on undertakings wrongly granted 
pecuniary advantages based on Community law must be no more stringent than those 
imposed on undertakings which have wrongly received similar advantages based on national 
law, provided that the two groups of recipients are in comparable situations and therefore 
different treatment is objectively unjustifiable.21 it also comes from Deutsche Milchkontor 
(Para. 33) that that Community law does not prevent national law from having regard, in 
excluding the recovery of unduly-paid aids, to such considerations as 
– the protection of legitimate expectation, 
– the loss of unjustified enrichment, 
– the passing of a time-limit, or 
– the fact that the administration knew, or was unaware owing to gross negligence on 
its part, that it was wrong in granting the aids in question. 
20 309/85 Barra, paras 17–18. 
21 Joined cases of 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and others, ECR 1983, 2633, para. 23. 
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Furthermore, national legal rules may also apply to 
– the burden of proof, and 
– the monitoring activity of the public authorities within the limits of non-
discrimination (Para. 39) and loyalty to Community interests (Para. 45). 
in the light of the judgment in Deutsche Milchkontor, one cannot really argue that 
recourse to the relief at source or the equal treatment of domestic and foreign financial 
intermediaries would be precluded, or the smooth operation of paying agents, who provide 
information and apply withholding tax in respect of foreign investors would be impossible. 
Simplification and more generosity in legislation does not mean that the tax authorities 
would not enjoy freedom in raising objections to the taxpayer’s conduct if necessary, 
withdrawing the possibility of having direct access to tax relief. The public authorities–
whether at a level of the Member State or the Community–may enjoy in certain areas (such 
as the Common Agricultural Policy) wide discretion as spelled out in the Berlin Butter 
case.22 The purpose of giving more emphasis to the effectiveness principle in the procedure 
of withholding taxation is not to restrict the scope of action of the tax authorities. it is only 
important to eliminate national legislation, the result of which would be to preclude 
simplified procedures and easy access to tax relief. 
The ECJ does not encroach upon the Member State’s right to introduce national 
procedural rules. This inaction is done, however, with the proviso that national rules must 
reflect the principles of equivalence (non-discrimination) and effectiveness. This means in 
procedural matters that it is the national law according to which cases must be decided, 
with the proviso, however, that the applicable national law–compared to that applicable to 
purely national cases–must not be for the citizens invoking Community law 
– less favourable, and 
– less efficient. 
Where disparities are experienced, the idea is not to do comparison between national 
jurisdictions, but to do that between the national rules applicable either to cross-border or 
purely domestic cases. Harmonisation can thus take place in an indirect way. it is not the 
national procedural rules that are to be approximated, but the national procedural rules are 
to be assessed in the context of cross-border and purely domestic cases. To the extent that 
cross-border cases will not be mistreated, national procedural law systems will not be 
approximated to each other. 
The above idea is plainly expressed in Peterbroeck. in this case, the period during 
which new pleas could be raised by the appellant under Belgian law had expired by the 
time the national court held its hearing so that the latter was deprived of the possibility of 
considering the question of compatibility of the national law issue with Community law 
whether the higher company tax rate applicable to foreigners resulted in restriction on the 
freedom of establishment. As explained by the ECJ, it is for the domestic legal system of 
each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights, which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. 
22 Joined cases 133 to 136/1985 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke, ECR 1987, 2289, para. 29. 
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However, such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions, nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law.23 
The requirements that the public authorities should have recourse to the Community 
law framework of coordination and that national law restrictions must not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the legislative goal are set in the ECJ practice not only in respect of 
foreign, but also of domestic resident taxpayers. As held in Baxter, the national tax 
authorities are not prevented from benefiting from the harmonised company law directives 
on annual accounts.24 Similarly, it is explained in Vestergaard that the EC Assistance 
Directive can be invoked by tax administrations.25 Furthermore, it is precluded to prevent 
the taxpayer from submitting evidence for the expenditure relating to research carried out in 
another Member State.26 it is also prohibited to prevent the taxpayer from submitting 
evidence for the deduction of the costs of training courses, taking place in another Member 
State.27 national legislation, which absolutely prevents the taxpayer from submitting 
evidence that expenditure relating to research carried out in other Member States has 
actually been incurred and satisfies the prescribed requirements cannot be justified in the 
name of effectiveness of fiscal supervision. As confirmed in Laboratoires Fournier, the 
possibility cannot be excluded “a priori” that the taxpayer is able to provide relevant 
documentary evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State of taxation to 
ascertain, clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the research expenditure 
incurred in other Member States.28 
(ii)  Equally effective treatment, equivalence of the treatment accorded  
in various Member States 
As it comes from Metallgesellschaft and Hoechst, it is precluded to apply national law 
restrictions by the national public authorities on a claim on the grounds that the taxpayer 
did not get involved in burdensome administrative proceedings to seek remedy first.29 in 
other words, there should be enough room available for parties to conduct legal disputes on 
fair terms. Similarly, the taxpayer should be granted enough room to have direct access to 
tax relief. Raise the tax authorities doubts on how much the taxpayer’s claim is established, 
they have the opportunity to challenge claims that seem to lack sufficient legal basis in a 
procedure of tax audit and the subsequent legal dispute. 
The ECJ holds in Inizan that Arts. 49 EC and 50 EC must be interpreted as not 
precluding legislation of a Member State which, first, makes reimbursement of the cost of 
23 C-312/93 Peterbroeck, ECR, 1995, i-4599, para. 12. See reference to the double requirement 
of equivalence and effectiveness already in San Giorgio, para. 12. They fist appear in 33/76 Rewe, 
ECR 1976, 1989, para. 5, and 45/76 Comet, ECR 1976, 2043, para. 13. These standards have been 
plainly explained in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame. Accordingly, national law criteria must not 
be less favourable than those applying to similar claims or actions based on domestic law, and must not 
be such as in practice to make it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain rights. See: Joined Cases 
C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, ECR 1996, i-1029, para. 90. 
24 See reference to Baxter above. 
25 C-55/98 Vestergaard, ECR 1999, i-7641, para. 26. 
26 C-254/97 Baxter, para. 19. 
27 C-55/98 Vestergaard, para. 25. 
28 C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier, ECR 2005, i-2057, para. 25. 
29 Joined cases C-397/98, C-410/98, ECR 2001, i-1727, para 107. 
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hospital care provided in a Member State other than that in which the insured person’s 
sickness fund is established conditional upon prior authorisation by that fund and, secondly, 
makes the grant of that authorisation subject to the condition that it be established that the 
insured person could not receive within the territory of the Member State, where the fund is 
established the treatment appropriate to his condition. However, authorisation may be 
refused on that ground only if treatment which is the same or equally effective for the 
patient can be obtained without undue delay in the territory of the Member State in which 
he or she resides.30 it is not precluded to introduce in a Member State a prior administrative 
authorisation scheme. it must be based, however, on a procedural system, which is easily 
accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for authorisation will be dealt with 
objectively and impartially within a reasonable time, and refusals to grant authorisation 
must also be capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings 
(Para. 57). 
The Community law requirement of achieving a treatment that is equally effective in 
comparable cases is a particular expression of the effectiveness principle, in this case spelled 
out in the context of the freedom to provide services. interestingly, the problem of Ms 
Inizan, a patient, is dealt with as a matter of the freedom to provide medical services. 
Similarly, the problem of a taxpayer crossing the border may raise the issue of financial 
intermediaries that are to exercise the freedom to provide services. in contrast to the case of 
Inizan, the question is either about the domestic financial service-providers, who accompany 
their clients abroad or about foreign financial intermediaries, who accompany their clients 
in the source country. in the light of the judgment in Inizan, it is any way doubtful whether 
“a priori” exclusion of gaining access to relief at source or prevention of foreign financial 
intermediaries from serving their clients in the host Member State is consistent with 
Community law. 
A Member State is not obliged to co-operate with its fellow Member State unless the 
denial of coordination with the other Member State would prevent citizens from exercising 
their fundamental rights across the Community. The EC Court made use of this standard in 
C-446/03 Marks and Spencer as well: for lack of a fiscal nexus established in the UK, the 
United Kingdom is not obliged to grant the opportunity of carrying over the losses of a 
Luxembourg subsidiary to a UK parent company unless the UK taxpayer proves that in 
Luxembourg there is no way of recognising any loss carryover for tax purposes. it is a 
novelty in the Advocate General’s opinion delivered on that case that he would extend the 
equivalence principle, germane to the concept of the internal market as introduced as of 
1993, to the matters of direct taxation, that is, to a territory where Member States traditionally 
enjoy freedom: a key to the solution of the problem is “the comparison and equivalence of 
the treatment accorded in various Member States”.31 
it is interesting to see in Marks and Spencer the way in which the proportionality 
principle has been utilised. This principle was used before in the simple sense that restrictive 
national measures could be challenged or approved, depending on whether they meet the 
proportionality test. The ECJ decision is new, however, at the point of Marks and Spencer 
that the UK national legislation is subject to the proportionality test in the instance where 
there is no explicit restriction by national law on any Community freedom that would be 
30 C-56/01 Inizan, ECR 2003, i-12403, para. 59. 
31 C-446/03 Marks and Spencer, ECR 2005, i-10837, para. 59, opinion of AG L. Poiares 
Maduro, para. 77. 
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plainly inconsistent with Community law. The proportionality principle would then be left 
in a vacuum. This is not yet the case in point because the gap arising from the lack of 
explicit restrictive national law measures is filled by the special meaning of Community 
law, suggested by the profession and represented by the ECJ. The expression of this meaning 
is a result of the recursively closed organisation of interpreting and applying Community 
law. The law that has been developed in Marks and Spencer is a product of self-generation, 
that is, it has been developed, not having a peculiar legislator, who would have been 
authorised to adopt the applicable law. 
A key to understanding the decision in C-446/03 Marks and Spencer lies in the EC 
Court’s assessment whether the opportunity of loss carryover for the company group has 
been fully exhausted in the particular case. it is not the UK law, strictly speaking, which is 
being evaluated. not a single legal measure of the UK tax law has been condemned in the 
abstract. it is the UK legal practice that has been condemned, not proven friendly enough in 
a particular case. no statutory provision of the UK tax law has been challenged. The UK 
law has been criticised, however, because its impact has been detrimental, constituting a 
restriction on the taxpayer’s right for cross-border loss carryover.32 
(iii)  Obligation of the tax authorities to have recourse to the facilities of harmonised  
Community law on tax procedures 
in Persche,33 the ECJ is uncertain, whether the EC Mutual Assistance Directive requires the 
tax authorities of the residence Member State to have recourse to the assistance of the 
competent authorities of the recipient body’s Member State of establishment to obtain the 
necessary information or whether, on the other hand, the said tax authorities may require 
the taxpayer himself or herself to provide all the necessary evidence. The question is here in 
other words of how to divide the burden of proof between the parties. Upon the finalisation 
of securities transactions, it is also a question how much foreign financial intermediaries 
and domestic resident paying agents are obliged to provide relevant information, and how 
much the local tax authorities may be requested by national law to have recourse to the 
facilities of the EC Mutual Assistance Directive, and approach their foreign counterparts. 
Where domestic or foreign intermediaries suffer from the unusually high-level requirement 
of strict liability, no balance of interests can be achieved. The national procedural law would 
be consistent with the proportionality principle if foreign intermediaries and domestic ones 
with foreign clients were obliged to a due care standard like their normal domestic 
counterparts. 
The Commission contends that, even if the EC Mutual Assistance Directive itself does 
not require a Member State to have recourse to the assistance of another Member State in 
order to inform itself of a fact, the evidence of which is in that other Member State, the 
former State would however be required, within the scope of application of Art. 56 EC, to 
have recourse to the possibilities offered by that directive in order to exclude any less 
favourable treatment of cross-border situations as compared to purely internal situations 
32 As a consequence of the judgment, the UK legislation was eager to fill the assumed gaps left 
after the judgment in Marks and Spencer, trying to put the issue of last resort into a context of revised 
statutory law. it is the paradoxical aspect of the case, however, that such a problem cannot simply be 
solved by statutory means. For more explanation see Deák, D.: Legal autopoiesis theory in operation–a 
study of the ECJ case of C-446/03 Marks and Spencer v. David Halsey. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 
49 (2008) 2, 163.
33 C-318/07, ECR 2009, i-359. 
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(Para. 36). Hence, the directive itself does not require the national authorities to have 
recourse to the facilities the directive provides. Such an obligation directly comes, however, 
from the principle of effectiveness as a positive standard (see its discussion above in 
connection with Arcaro). The requirements are thus relevant that the national authorities are 
obliged to follow a procedure in which it is possible to achieve the result envisaged by 
Community law, and that national law must be interpreted consistently with Community 
law. The positive standard of effectiveness makes a requirement for national procedural law 
by means of invoking substantive Community law to be extracted from Community 
freedoms. 
Since the EC Mutual Assistance Directive provides for the possibility of national tax 
authorities requesting information which they cannot obtain for themselves, the EC Court 
has ruled that the use, in Art. 2 (1) of the EC Mutual Assistance Directive, of the word 
“may” indicates that, whilst those authorities have the possibility of requesting information 
from the competent authorities of another Member State, such a request does not in any 
way constitute an obligation. it is for each Member State to assess the specific cases in 
which information concerning transactions by taxable persons in its territory is lacking and 
to decide whether those cases justify submitting a request for information to another 
Member State.34 The ECJ argues that it is left for the Member State to legislate whether, 
and in what conditions, the national authorities are obliged to have recourse to the mutual 
assistance with the tax authorities of another Member State. The Member State of legislation 
remains nevertheless to be subject to the proportionality principle. This is a position slightly 
different from that taken by the Commission. namely, the latter refers to the positive 
standard of effectiveness and, therefore, concludes that the affected Member State is obliged 
to ensure the enforcement of Community freedoms. The ECJ is confined to a meta-principle 
(proportionality), while the Commission substantiates its position by referring to 
substantive law. 
Furthermore, the ECJ holds that a Member State cannot exclude the grant of tax 
advantages for gifts made to a body established and recognised as charitable in another 
Member State on the sole ground that, in relation to such bodies, the tax authorities of the 
former Member State are unable to check, on-the-spot, compliance with the requirements 
which their tax legislation imposes. An on-the-spot inspection is not usually required since 
the monitoring of compliance with the conditions imposed by the national legislation is 
carried out, generally, by checking the information provided by those bodies (Paras 66–67). 
The national authorities that preclude the possibility of relief at source cannot thus justify 
this restriction by referring to the difficulties in organising on-the-spot audits if necessary 
because the organisation of such audits is always an extra burden for the authorities, no 
matter whether they have to conduct examination within the country or in another 
Member State. 
The taxpayer in Twoh, a Dutch company, supplied computer parts to another company 
residing in italy. Twoh was required only to place the goods at the buyer’s disposal at a 
warehouse situated in the netherlands. Twoh issued invoices on intra-Community deliveries 
and, consequently, did not pay VAT. The Dutch tax authorities were of the opinion that 
Twoh did not demonstrate that the goods were transported to another Member State. The 
taxpayer requested the tax authorities to rely on the EC Mutual Assistance Directive and the 
34  Para 65. See also, in C-184/05 Twoh International, ECR 2007, i-7897, para. 32. 
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EC Administrative Cooperation Regulation35 and gather information from the competent 
italian tax authorities, but the Dutch tax authorities refuted to meet this requirement. 
The ECJ considers that, as the Commission has correctly argued, the principle that the 
burden of proving entitlement to a tax derogation or exemption rests upon the person 
seeking to benefit from such a right is to be viewed as being within the limits imposed by 
Community law. Thus, it is for the supplier of the goods to furnish the proof that the 
conditions for exemption (Para. 26). What is important in this case is the fact that Twoh, 
being unable to provide the necessary evidence to establish that the goods have in fact been 
dispatched to the destination Member State, has requested the netherlands tax authorities to 
gather information that should be capable of demonstrating the intra-Community nature of 
its supplies, obtaining information from the competent authority of that latter Member State, 
in application of the EC Mutual Assistance Directive and the EC Administrative Cooperation 
Regulation (Para. 28). 
As it comes from respect of the proportionality principle, where the taxpayer is unable 
to obtain the necessary evidence, being not able to approach the competent authorities of 
another Member State, the local tax authorities are obliged to act and provide the taxpayer 
with the relevant information. The local tax authorities may thus explicitly be obliged to 
rely on the EC Mutual Assistance Directive even upon the finalisation of securities 
transactions where the taxpayer is for objective reasons prevented from gaining access to 
evidence. For instance, local paying agents with foreign clients may have serious difficulties 
in approaching the foreign tax authorities if necessary. Similarly, the local authorities may 
not require from foreign financial intermediaries to obtain a local tax iD where it is easy for 
the tax authorities to approach the competent tax authorities of the home Member State and 
check if the tax iD showed is authentic. 
in the joined cases of C-155/08 X and C-157/08 Passenheim-van Schoot,36 the Dutch 
tax authorities obtained information from the Belgian tax authorities among other things of 
the savings account of a Dutch resident taxpayer held with a Luxembourg subsidiary of the 
Belgian-based Kredietbank. The Dutch tax authorities were not in a position of providing 
any evidence for tax evasion. They were, however, eager to initiate a procedure of fiscal 
supervision. This was the case because the assets of the Dutch taxpayer, which were 
deposited in Luxembourg and concealed from the Dutch tax authorities, were subject to net 
wealth tax in the netherlands. The Dutch tax authorities wanted to benefit from the Dutch 
tax law, which said that the normal five-year period of the statute of limitations for tax 
assessment could be extended to 12 years (from the date when the tax debt arose) in respect 
of the assets held outside the netherlands. 
The taxpayer raised the issue as to whether these Dutch rules on the extended recovery 
period and the related calculation of tax penalty do not constitute an obstacle to the freedom 
to provide services and the free movement of capital that cannot be justified. The extent to 
which the Luxembourg bank secrecy should be lifted in order to facilitate the exchange of 
tax information between the Dutch and Belgian tax authorities in accordance with the EC 
Assistance Directive is a secondary issue, ancillary to the main subject. 
For the purposes of answering the question whether the netherlands can be forgiven 
for introducing an extended recovery period in cross-border cases, the ECJ distinguished 
35 Council Regulation 218/92/EEC on administrative cooperation in the field of indirect taxation 
(as amended), OJ L 24, 1.2.92, 1. 
36 ECR 2009, i-5093.
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between fiscal evasion and fiscal supervision (Para. 63). Where there is no evidence 
available for the tax authorities to combat tax evasion, it can be accepted that an extended 
period of the statute of limitations is applicable. Where, however, the tax authorities hold 
any means of evidence in order to discover tax liability in a cross-border case, the tax 
authorities have already the right to request information from the other Member State. 
The provision of information cannot be denied in particular where the requesting 
authorities have been in a position to gain knowledge of the case, but they need more 
information to complete their investigation. Where, however, for lack of sufficient 
information, the tax authorities are not able to provide any evidence of a particular case, 
a Member State is allowed to console itself by enhancing the chances of discovering unpaid 
tax even by extending the period of the statute of limitations for the recovery of the 
assessment of tax.37 Where the national legislation is proportionate with the aim of 
discovering fiscal evasion, the restrictions on any Community freedom that are developed 
because of the application of national law can be justified.38 
Where cross-border securities transactions are finalised, the tax authorities may 
obviously hold information that is enough for them to rely on the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive in respect of both domestic and foreign resident taxpayers. “A priori” exclusion of 
relief at source or the mistreatment of domestic resident withholding agents or foreign 
financial intermediaries cannot thus be justified. With regard to the facilities available due 
to the operation of the Mutual Assistance Directive, the scope of the national legislator to 
act by introducing special measures, including restrictions on the legal management of 
cross-border cases, does not seem to be very wide. The ECJ explained that the mere fact 
that the taxable items concerned are located in another Member State does not justify the 
application of an extended recovery period. One can conclude from this statement that the 
exclusion of the facility of relief at source cannot be justified either by the mere fact that 
income is derived abroad or by foreigners. 
5.  Effectiveness to be granted to domestic and foreign resident taxpayers through  
harmonisation in fiscal matters 
in the area of tax law, the question can be raised as to whether the exclusion of tax matters 
from the scope of internal market legislation can be extended not only to substantive tax 
law, but also to the procedural matters of taxation. One could argue that procedural tax law 
and cooperation in tax matters between the tax authorities of the Member States constitute 
issues that go beyond the scope of tax harmonisation. Reference to the EC Taxation Savings 
Directive,39 a reporting rather than a tax directive, can also be made in order to enhance the 
significance of cross-border cooperation in tax matters in terms of the exercise of Community 
freedoms. The matter of cooperation between the public authorities in tax matters should 
then extend beyond simply dealing with taxes. Arguably, free competition–the basic 
institution of the EU–can be distorted for lack of sincere cooperation between the public 
authorities, whether competent in tax or non-tax matters. 
This is the logic the Commission followed in the case of C-533/03 Commission v. 
Council, when it was required before the ECJ–in vain–to base a range of amendments made 
to the existing EC directives and regulations on the cross-border cooperation in tax matters 
37 Paras 44 and 57. 
38 Paras 52–53, 72–73 and 75. 
39 Council Directive 2003/48/EC (as amended), OJ L 157, 26.06.2003, 38. 
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on the legal basis of the internal market legislation rather than on the provisions of the old 
way of fiscal harmonisation to be achieved progressively in the common market (Art. 93 
EC, Art. 113 TFEU).40 in C-533/03 Commission v. Council, the Commission contends that 
Council Regulation 1798/2003/EC41 and the directive, modifying the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive,42 are not adopted on a correct legal basis. in essence, both the parties and the ECJ 
follow the arguments known already from case C-338/01. 
in the case of C-533/03, the ECJ held (in Para. 45) that “lex specialis” prevails over 
“lex generalis”, and this is why Art. 93 EC Treaty on tax harmonisation should take priority 
over Art. 95 EC Treaty (Art. 114 TFEU) on overall internal market legislation in this case. 
As a consequence, the provisions on the cooperation of tax authorities must be treated as 
tax provisions. The issue of cooperation of the public authorities in tax matters cannot thus 
be separated from the contents of taxation. in other words, as Community law stands at 
present, the term of tax sovereignty should comprise not only substantive tax law provisions, 
but also the rules that are applicable to tax procedures. Unfortunately, attempts to seek to 
establish distinction between fiscal (substantive tax law) harmonisation and cooperation 
(procedural tax law harmonisation) have ended in failure, although one can argue that the 
law on Community cooperation should go beyond the mere subject of the harmonisation of 
substantive tax law provisions. it remains a task for the future to establish this claim better. 
in C-349/03 Commission v. UK, the UK tax authorities were condemned to the extent 
that they denied cross-border cooperation in tax matters in respect of Gibraltar on the 
grounds that the latter is not part of the EU customs territory, and thus the harmonised rules 
on VAT and excise duties were not applicable. The ECJ held that the exclusion of Gibraltar 
from the EU customs territory does not mean that Gibraltar fell outside the requirement of 
mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States. The substantive tax 
law issue has thus clearly been separated from the matter of mutual assistance in tax 
matters.43 
The ECJ does not seem to be consistent in deciding in these two cases. The difference 
in the positions the ECJ took can be reconciled, however, in so far as the two questions 
were raised in different ways. in the first case (C-533/03 Commission v. Council), the ECJ 
supported the standpoint of the EC Council that resisted the extension of the scope of 
harmonisation in the particular respect of administrative tax law due to lack of political 
consensus. in the second case (C-349/03 Commission v. UK), the ECJ reasoning was driven 
by the possibly strictest interpretation of the derogation granted to the UK upon the EC 
accession of the UK. This difference in context seems to give sufficient explanation for the 
difference in the conclusions that the ECJ arrived at in the two cases. 
The Commission contends in C-349/03 Commission v. UK that the EC Mutual 
Assistance Directive does not affect “the tax law as such of the Member States” (Para. 22). 
The Member States’ competence to legislate tax should in this respect be confined to 
substantive tax law matters. Even if the harmonised rules of VAT do not apply to Gibraltar, 
the information of the taxpayers registered for VAT purposes in Spain and engaged in 
contacts with Gibraltar-based parties may be relevant for Spanish VAT purposes. The 
Commission plainly argues that the effectiveness principle of Community law requires the 
40 ECR 2006, i-1025, para. 25. For the Council’s arguments, see para. 33. 
41 OJ L 264, 15.10.03, 1. 
42 That is, Council Directive 2003/93/EC, 15.10.03, OJ L 264, 23. 
43 ECR 2005, i-7321, para. 53. 
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extension to Gibraltar of the mutual information system (Para. 24). This example shows 
that the scope of procedural tax rules may exceed that of substantive tax law matters. Where 
harmonisation in substantive tax law can be a taboo, this is not necessarily true for the 
procedural aspect of tax law. 
The Spanish Government argues that distinction must be made depending on whether 
a cooperation measure relates to a tax harmonisation objective or relates simply to a 
measure, which confined itself to laying down rules for cooperation between the Member 
States (Para. 28). Tax cooperation measures may thus have two layers: they may consist of 
tax harmonisation provisions, properly speaking, and provisions on unqualified cooperation. 
The UK argument is, on the contrary, that the administration of a tax system and the 
revenue-raising power of a Member State are inextricably linked to each other (Para. 34). 
According to the UK, fiscal provisions concern not only the conditions of substantive tax 
liability, but also arrangements for the collection of taxes (Para. 36). 
The ECJ approved that there should be provisions of simple cooperation that cannot be 
regarded as acts on tax harmonisation (Para. 44). The EC Mutual Assistance Directive is 
still interpreted in the context of the UK accession treaty (Para. 46), and it may not affect 
common cases. Under Para. 47 of the judgment, procedural tax law rules are discussed in 
this case as acts on harmonisation, and not as fiscal provisions within the meaning of Art. 
95 (2) EC [on exceptions to the scope of internal market legislation, currently Art. 114 (2) 
TFEU]. Where tax procedural rules are discussed under in the disguise of harmonisation 
acts, they may go beyond the scope of tax law. Harmonisation acts cannot be adopted, 
however, without the explicit approval of the Member States. Where tax procedural rules 
are related to fiscal rules, they should mean not only substantive, but also procedural tax 
law provisions. 
in C-338/01 Commission v. Council,44 the Commission contends that the purpose of 
the directives that modify the EC Recovery Directive45 is to bring about the internal market. 
They must accordingly be based on the Treaty basis on internal market legislation (Para. 
18). in view of the fact that Art. 95(2) EC [Art. 114 (2) TFEU] constitutes an exception to 
the principle set out in Art. 95(1) EC, it should be narrowly construed and its application is 
restricted to what is necessary for the attainment of its objectives, such as the protection of 
the Member States’ sovereignty in matters relating to taxation (Para. 19). The Commission 
holds that the substantive tax law of the different Member States is not affected by the 
modification of the Recovery Directive (Para. 20). One could thus argue that sovereignty of 
the Member States to be exercised in fiscal matters is not extended to procedural tax law 
issues, and fiscal provisions would not relate to the rules of tax procedures in the context of 
Art. 114 (2) TFEU. 
Furthermore, the modifying directives do not simply concern the smooth operation of 
the internal market. They are aimed among other things at bringing about the fiscal neutrality 
of the internal market, the European Parliament contends (Para. 24). The term of fiscal 
neutrality should go beyond the scope of tax law. it should thus relate to the smooth 
operation of the internal market. The Parliament also argues that Council Directive 2001/44/
EC46 does not create a “sui generis” European procedure of the recovery of taxes. instead, it 
44 ECR 2004, i-4829. 
45 Council Directive 76/308/EEC, OJ L 73, 19.3.76, 18, significantly amended by the contested 
Council Directive 2001/44/EC, L 175, 28.6.01, 17. 
46 OJ L 175, 28.6.01, 17. 
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merely prescribes national treatment for foreign claims (Para. 25). The Directive provides a 
framework only that allows Member States to continue to be sovereign in tax matters. 
in contrast to the above arguments, the Council gives a broader meaning to the term of 
“fiscal provisions”. They mean not only any measure regulating public revenue, or covering 
not only the definition and description of taxes, but also the manner in which taxes are 
assessed and collected (Para. 36). The term of fiscal should therefore be extended not only 
to substantive, but also to procedural tax law (and it should thus be confined to tax law) in 
the context of Art. 95 (2) TEC, the Council argues. Further on, a restrictive approach would 
be dependent on political assessments in respect of tax procedures, something, which would 
be at variance with the system of the attribution of powers within the Community and with 
the principle of legal certainty (Para. 37). 
The United Kingdom Government criticises the Commission for its unduly strict 
interpretation of the term “fiscal provisions” and for failing to take account of the opening 
sentence of Art. 95(1) EC, to the effect that this provision applies only “where nothing in 
the Treaty provides otherwise”. Article 93 EC and Art. 94 EC are both special provisions 
for the adoption of measures relating to direct and indirect taxes (Para. 50). The UK 
Government adds that the term “fiscal” used in the English-language version of Art. 95 EC 
embraces not only taxation “stricto sensu”, but also public spending and borrowing. 
Contrary to the Commission’s contention, there is no justification for drawing a distinction 
between the rules on taxable persons, taxable events, bases of taxation, rates and exemptions, 
and the rules for the administration and enforcement of taxes (Para. 52). 
The ECJ held that, by reason of their general character, the words relating to fiscal 
matters cover not only all areas of taxation, without drawing any distinction between the 
types of duties or taxes concerned, but also all aspects of taxation, whether material rules or 
procedural ones (Para. 63). it should further be added that the decisive criterion for purposes 
of comparison with a view to the application of Art. 90 EC (Art. 110 TFEU) is the actual 
effect of each tax on domestic production, on the one hand, and on imported products, on 
the other. Even where the rate is the same, the effect of the tax may vary according to the 
detailed rules for the assessment and collection thereof applied to domestic production and 
imported products (Para. 65). 
III. Conclusions 
Where the institutions of the retention at source of taxes and the prevention of foreign 
financial intermediaries from assuming in the source country the liability to file tax 
information and arrange for the payment of tax in fair conditions comparable to their 
domestic counterparts are to be assessed in the light of the relevant Community law as 
communicated by the ECJ, it is crucial while concluding whether national legal practices of 
withholding taxation are consistent with Community law to apply the proportionality 
principle in specific cases. Where the application of the proportionality principle dictates us 
in a specific case respect of the effectiveness principle in enforcing rights both on the side 
of the tax authorities and taxpayers, an avenue may open up for progressively removing 
barriers from the clearing and settlement of securities transactions across the border. 
The cornerstones for such avenues can be reconstructed from the positions the ECJ has 
developed in particular as follows: 
“… the use of retention at source represented a proportionate means of ensuring the 
recovery of the tax debts of the State of taxation. The same is true of the potential 
liability of the recipient of services who is required to make such a retention, as that 
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enables the absence of retention at source to be penalised if necessary. Since that 
liability constitutes the corollary of that method of collecting income tax, it too 
contributes in a proportionate manner to ensuring the effectiveness of collecting the 
tax.” (paras 37–38 in FKP Scorpio); 
“… the taxpayer should not be excluded a priori from providing relevant documentary 
evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State imposing the tax to ascertain, 
clearly and precisely, that he is not attempting to avoid or evade the payment of taxes 
(see, to that effect, Case C-254/97 Baxter and Others [1999] ECR i-4809, paragraphs 
19 and 20, and Case C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier [2005] ECR i-2057, paragraph 
25).” (Para. 96 in ELiSA); 
“Since Directive 77/799 provides for the possibility of national tax authorities 
requesting information which they cannot obtain for themselves, the Court has ruled 
that the use, in Article 2(1) of Directive 77/799, of the word ‘may’ indicates that, whilst 
those authorities have the possibility of requesting information from the competent 
authority of another Member State, such a request does not in any way constitute an 
obligation. it is for each Member State to assess the specific cases in which information 
concerning transactions by taxable persons in its territory is lacking and to decide 
whether those cases justify submitting a request for information to another Member 
State (Twoh international, para. 32).” (para. 65 in Persche). 
Unfortunately, contradictions hidden in the first two items above of ECJ assertions can 
hardly be reconciled.47 it cannot then be understood why the domestic resident recipient of 
a foreign service-provider–being, e.g. a local fiscal agent–is “a priori” excluded from 
providing evidence, enabling the tax authorities of the source Member State to ascertain 
that he or she is not attempting to avoid or evade the payment of taxes while seeking to gain 
access to relief at source of taxation. As an alternative, the position granted to the local 
paying agent could arguably be extended to a foreign resident investor or a foreign financial 
intermediary accompanying its clients across the border. 
it is bad news for the taxpayers engaged in cross-border securities transactions that the 
applicability of the proportionality principle is subject to a case-by-case assessment; it is 
thus for each Member State to assess the specific cases in which information concerning 
transactions by taxable persons in its territory is lacking and to decide whether those cases 
justify submitting a request for information to another Member State. The domestic tax 
authorities may well conclude in a specific case that it is not necessary to initiate mutual 
assistance with the tax authorities of another Member State. it is good news, however, that 
the domestic tax authorities must certainly not arrive at a final decision unless they make an 
assessment of the case under examination before. 
it is a key to the application of the proportionality principle that rights and obligations 
must be allocated according to the facts and circumstances of the specific case. This means, 
for example, that it is not enough to require alleviation of foreign financial intermediaries 
from strict liability. instead, their liability should be adjusted to the real case. There are a 
47 notably, the ECJ answers the question, whether the procedure of retention at source of tax is 
consistent with Community law without regard to whether the services provided to FKP Scorpio are 
deemed to take place within the Community. 
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few issues48 that can be highlighted to illustrate how the proportionality principle can be 
operated as follows: 
– “a priori” exclusion of relief at source seems to violate the proportionality principle 
in general; the introduction of a quick refund procedure (not appearing in the OECD 
implementation Package) may be helpful, however, to find a balance between the legislative 
goals and means in respect of withholding taxation; 
– the source country’s request for applying for a new tax identification number does 
not comply with the idea of holding a single European passport, otherwise available for 
financial enterprises both under the EC Consolidated Banking Directive;49 
– under the harmonised Community law on VAT refund, appointment of fiscal 
representatives must not be requested by the source Member State;50 such a rule could be 
extended to the tax treatment upon the finalisation of cross-border securities transactions as 
well with a view to respecting the proportionality principle; 
– from the perspective of the application of the proportionality principle, an ideal 
solution could be the provision of information by the financial intermediary to the source 
country’s authorities and, in turn, the transfer of information by the source country to the 
residence country; this option is preferred both by the OECD and the EC Taxation Savings 
Directive; 
– while designing the allocation of rights and liabilities of all members that may be 
engaged in a custody chain, it is necessary to coordinate the status of authorised 
intermediaries with that of domestic withholding agents; and 
– respect of the proportionality principle requires to bear in mind that the intermediary 
that has the closest relationship with the investor has access to information about the 
investor what may entail strict liability while the domestic withholding agent does not have 
strict liability for under-withholding; in fact, proposed procedures are intended the reduce 
the risk of under-withholding, but not necessarily the authorised intermediary’s liability. 
48 OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Report by the pilot group on improving 
procedures for tax relief for cross-border investors; Possible improvements to procedures for tax relief 
for cross-border investors: implementation Package; Public discussion draft; 8 February 2010 to 31 
August 2010, 9–10. 
49 indent 7 of the recitals of Directive 2006/48/EC of the EP and the Council, OJ L 177, 30.6.06, 
as amended. 
50 Art. 204 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC, as amended, OJ L 347, 11.12.06. 
